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JURISDICTION 
This Court has jurisdiction to hear this appeal based on 
Article VIII of the Constitution of the State of Utah; Utah 
Code Ann, § 78-2-2(3) (j) (Repl. Vol, 9, 1987); Rule 54(b) of 
the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, certifying the rulings and 
orders as final and appealable; and Rules 3 and 4 of the Rules 
of the Utah Supreme Court. 
PROCEEDINGS BELOW 
This is an appeal from the following findings, judgments and 
orders rendered by the Honorable Dennis L. Draney, of the Eighth 
Judicial District Court of Daggett County, State of Utah: 
1. The Court's ruling dated September 8, 1989, and 
subsequent Order dated September 26, 1989, striking defendant's 
affirmative defenses 3 through 7 and dismissing the first cause 
of action of its counterclaim. (Record at 221 and 239-41). 
2. The findings and order dated July 12, 1989, denying 
defendant's motion to dismiss. (Record at 145-51). 
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3. The findings and order dated July 12, 1989, granting 
plaintiff's motion for an order of immediate occupancy. (Record 
at 145-51). 
These rulings and orders were certified as final appealable 
orders pursuant to Rule 54(b) of the Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure in an order granting defendant's motion to certify 
dated December 5, 1989. (Record at 288-89) A Notice of Appeal 
was filed in the district court dated December 15, 1989. (Record 
at 292-93). 
The trial court denied defendant's motion to dismiss based 
on claims that the town did not have the authority to condemn and 
that the Town of Manila had not followed the proper statutory 
procedures for condemnation. The court also granted the 
plaintiff's motion for an order of immediate occupancy. The 
defendant/appellant seeks to have the trial court's order 
reversed on the issue of the town's authority to condemn and to 
remand for a full hearing on the merits as to the issue of 
whether the Town has met the statutory requisites for 
condemnation. 
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ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
Issue I 
Whether the Town is prohibited from acquiring by 
condemnation, real property located outside of its corporate 
boundaries for a sewage lagoon. 
Issue II 
Whether municipalities classified as "Towns" are excluded 
from the delegation of the power to condemn under the Utah 
Constitution. 
Issue III 
Whether the statutory power to acquire a fee simple 
interest in real property is limited by statute to specific 
purposes which do not include the purpose presented here. 
Issue IV 




Whether the Town's right to condemn can finally be 
determined only after a trial on the merits. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. Nature of the Case. 
Action was brought in the Eighth Judicial District Court by 
the Town of Manila (hereafter "Town" and "Respondent"), to 
condemn land owned by Broadbent Land Company (hereafter 
"Broadbent" and "Appellant"), located in Daggett County, Utah. 
Following the filing of its Complaint, the Town moved for an 
Order of Immediate Occupancy pending a trial on the merits of 
the case. Broadbent filed a Motion to Dismiss challenging the 
Town's power to condemn. 
B. Disposition in the Trial Court. 
The Motions came on for hearing before the District Court on 
June 29, 1989. The Court received evidence and heard testimony 
only on those issues surrounding the Town's prima facie burden of 
proof on the Motion for an Order of Immediate Occupancy. The 
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Motion to Dismiss was argued based solely on the authorities 
cited in the Memorandums in Support of and in Opposition to the 
Motion to Dismiss. No evidence was received on the issue of the 
Town's power to condemn. This evidentiary issue was specifically 
reserved on the record for a trial on the merits. Following the 
hearing limited to the Order of Immediate Occupancy, the Court 
made its Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, granted the 
Motion for the Order of Immediate Occupancy and denied 
Broadbent's Motion to Dismiss. 
On July 21, 1989, Broadbent filed an Amended Answer and 
Counterclaim raising various affirmative defenses. The Town 
subsequently filed a Motion to Strike the Affirmative Defenses 
and to dismiss several of the counterclaims on August 1, 1989. 
Broadbent filed a Memorandum in Opposition to the Motion to 
Dismiss the Counterclaim and to Strike the Affirmative Defenses 
on August 23, 1989. On September 8, 1989, the Court made a 
dispositive Ruling denying Broadbent's Motion to Strike the 
Town's Reply Memorandum and granting the Town's Motion to Strike 
Broadbentfs Affirmative Defenses 3 through 7 and to Dismiss the 
First Cause of Action of Broadbentfs Counterclaim. 
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Broadbent filed a Motion pursuant to Rule 54(b) of the Utah 
Rules of Civil Procedure requesting Judge Draney to Certify his 
Findings, Rulings and Orders as Final and Appealable Orders as 
provided for in Rule 3(a) of the Rules of the Utah Supreme 
Court, Judge Draney granted Broadbent's Motion to Certify and an 
Order Granting the Motion was entered on December 5, 1989. Based 
upon the Order Granting the Motion to Certify, a Notice of Appeal 
was filed in the District Court dated December 15, 1989. 
FACTS RELEVANT TO THE ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
1. The Town brought an action on or about March 22, 1989, 
to condemn Broadbent*s real property for the installation and 
construction of a "total containment lagoon" for disposal of 
waste water and sewage. (Record at 1, f 1) . The Town then 
sought an order of immediate occupancy which was granted over 
Broadbentfs objection. (Record at 9 and 149; transcript of 
hearing on Order of Immediate Occupancy, page 5-25). 
2. The property which the Town has condemned is prime 
agricultural land adjacent to Flaming Gorge National Recreation 
Area, ("Property"). (Record at 126, f 3). 
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3. The Property is located outside of the municipal 
boundaries of the Town of Manila and ijs in Daggett County. 
(Transcript of hearing on Order of Immediate Occupancy, page 19, 
lines 22-23) . 
4. This farmland is part of a larger contiguous parcel of 
land which is currently producing alfalfa. (Record at 12 6, f 4; 
transcript of hearing on Order of Immediate Occupancy, page 213, 
lines 10-18). 
5. The condemnation will take a minimum of thirty acres of 
prime agricultural farmland out of production. (Record at 127, f 
10; transcript of hearing on Order of Immediate Occupancy, page 
155, lines 5-12). 
6. The condemnation includes a on£-thousand foot buffer 
zone surrounding the Property which cannot be used for any 
building purpose and which was not included in the Town's 
appraised value which was the basis for th^ required deposit paid 
into Court. (Transcript of hearing on Order of Immediate 
Occupancy, page 47, lines 15-25; page 4& lines 1-3; page 191 
lines 4-24). 
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7. Furthermore, the total containment sewage lagoon will 
damage the value of the remaining Property. (Record at 127, 5 
9) . This severance damage is not included in the amount 
deposited with the Court by the Town. (Transcript of hearing on 
Order of Immediate Occupancy, page 43, lines 22-25). 
8. The Property is unique given its proximity to the 
Flaming Gorge National Recreational Area because it is producing 
farmland in Daggett County which is largely barren. (Record at 
127, M 11-12). 
9. Appellant was never asked nor given an opportunity to 
accompany an appraiser during any inspection of the Property. 
(Record at 12 6, J 6; transcript of hearing on Order of Immediate 
Occupancy, page 194, lines 7-14). 
10. Prior to the filing of the Complaint in this matter, 
neither Broadbent nor any other officer, agent or representative 
was given an offer of just compensation in any amount for the 
Property. (Transcript of hearing on Order of Immediate Occupancy, 
page 52, lines 18-22). 
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11. Prior to the filing of this acti6n Broadbent was never 
given an appraisal or a written statement and summary in any 
amount as just compensation for the Property and/or damage to the 
remainder which will be caused by the condemnation. (Record at 
12 6, f 7; transcript of hearing on Order o^ Immediate Occupancy, 
page 41, lines 5-7; page 52 lines 23-25; page 61, lines 9-11; 
page 194, lines 15-24). 
12. Broadbent has never been given afry notice by the Town, 
nor any agent or representative of the Town, of the basic 
protections provided by the Utah Relocatioh Assistance Act (Utah 
Code Ann., §§ 57-12-1 et seq.). (Transcript of hearing on Order 
of Immediate Occupancy, page 41, lines 14^22; page 52, lines 4-
17; page 62, lines 10-13). Furthermore, rto other officer, agent 
or representative of Broadbent has been given such notice. 
(Record at 127, J 8). 
13. At least three alternative sitesl are available for the 
location of the lagoon. The alternative sites have fewer 
environmental problems and will be more economical to develop. 
(Record at 114-16; transcript of hearing on Order of Immediate 
Occupancy, page 206, lines 1-25; page 207, lines 1-12). 
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14, Alternative treatment processes are also available 
which can be located on the site of the existing treatment 
facility and which will not require the acquisition of 
additional land outside the boundaries of the Town or require a 
buffer area. (Transcript of hearing on Order of Immediate 
Occupancy, page 206, lines 1-25; page 207, lines 1-12). The 
alternative processes are also less costly. (Record at 114-16; 
transcript of hearing on Order of Immediate Occupancy, page 204, 
lines 4-25; page 204, lines 1-10). 
15. The sewage lagoon has been identified as a possible 
threat to bird species which inhabit the area the Town seeks to 




Broadbent's Brief contains three m^jor points, none of 
which has been met by the Town. Those three points are: 
(1) The Utah Constitution, under Article XI, § 5(b) 
and (c), gives the power of condemnation to cities only 
and, therefore, towns have no constitutional authority 
to condemn; 
(2) There is no statutory authority for a town to 
condemn in fee simple. Indeed, a town's ability to 
condemn for an easement is questionable in light of 
towns1 lack of constitutional authority to condemn; and 
(3) There is no authority whatsoever for a town to 
condemn property located outside of its town 
boundaries. 
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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
A. THE TOWN OF MANILA, 
POINT I 
The Town urges the Court to adopt a construction of Utah 
statutes which would grant municipalities the right to 
"acquire", by condemnation, property for sewage treatment 
facilities. Such an interpretation is contrary to the express 
provisions of the Utah Constitution in Article XI, Section 5, 
which grant to cities only the powers to condemn, and is also in 
opposition to the rules of statutory construction which urge 
constitutional construction of statutes whenever possible. In 
order to construe the Utah statutes in a harmonious manner with 
the Utah Constitution, the Utah statutes must not be interpreted 
as giving towns the power of condemnation. 
POINT II 
The Utah Constitution distinguishes between towns and 
cities. The Town has not cited a single case which illustrates 
authority of a town to condemn private property. While Title 10, 
Chapter 8 of the Utah Code specifically confers upon towns the 
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same powers and authority granted to cities under Chapter 8, 
Chapter 8 does not give cities the power of eminent domain and, 
therefore, cannot be relied on as authority for a town to 
exercise eminent domain. Furthermore, the power to condemn 
property must be specifically conferred, it cannot be implied. 
Additionally, under Utah Code Ann., Section 78-34-1(3) and (9) 
and Section 78-34-2, the only right which may be granted to a 
town for the exercise of eminent domain for a public use is an 
easement. Finally, there is simply no authority for a 
condemnation of property outside the town's boundaries for 
construction of a sewage lagoon. 
POINT III 
The Town failed to comply with the statutory requirements 
necessary for granting an order of immediate occupancy. The 
court failed to make a full inquiry into both the necessity of 
the taking and the compliance with the statutory prerequisites. 
The Town also failed to establish damages which would accrue from 
the condemnation and the reasons for requiring a speedy 
occupation of the property. The court cannot have correctly 
ruled on the motion for the order of immediate occupancy without 
taking evidence on the damages which would accrue to Broadbent. 
These damages have been exacerbated by the deliberate strategy of 
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the Town in forging ahead with its occupation of the property and 
construction of the lagoon when the Town was on notice that its 
authority to condemn was in question and that there had not been 
a final determination on this issue. 
POINT IV 
Broadbent is not asking for a second evidentiary hearing on 
the issues of law, but rather is asking for an opportunity for an 
initial evidentiary hearing. The hearing on the order of 
immediate occupancy was limited solely to the Town's burden of 
making a prima facie case to substantiate an order of immediate 
occupancy and this hearing cannot substitute for a trial on the 
merits according to Utah law. 
B. THE UTAH LEAGUE OF CITIES AND TOWNS, 
The League, like the Town, cannot cite a single precedent 
for the proposition that a town has authority to condemn 
property. The League cites to the case of Wadsworth et al v. 
Santaouin City et. al.. 83 Utah 321, 28 P.2d 161 (Utah 1933), 
however, the question before the court in Wadsworth was whether 
"non chartered" cities are actually "cities" within the meaning 
of Article XI, Section 5. The court found that non chartered 
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cities had the same powers as chartered cities since the Utah 
Constitution does not make a distinction between non chartered 
and chartered cities. The crucial distinction with towns is that 
the Utah Constitution does make a distinction between cities and 
towns and, even according to Wadsworth, the courts must follow 
that distinction. 
REPLY TO ARGUMENT OF TOWN OF MANILA 
POINT I: THE TOWN URGES AN UNCONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION OF 
THE UTAH STATUTES. 
The Town attempts to address the three major points in 
Broadbent's Brief by arguing that towns have the same powers as 
cities. For example, in an attempt to prove that Utah case law 
has interpreted Article XI § 5 of the Utah Constitution as 
conferring the same authority upon cities and towns, the Town 
cites only to a case which held that Article XI § 5 does not 
distinguish between incorporated and unincorporated cities. The 
case does not even mention towns, let alone deal with a town's 
power to condemn. 
The Town urges the Court to adopt a construction of the 
Utah statutes which would grant municipalities the right to 
"acquire", by condemnation, property for sewage treatment 
facilities. Such an interpretation is contrary to the express 
15 
provisions of the Utah Constitution, and is in opposition to the 
rules of statutory construction which urge constitutional 
construction of statutes whenever possible. Courts frequently 
assert that: 
[e]very presumption favors the validity of an act of 
the legislature and that all doubts must be resolved in 
support of the Act. Likewise, it is presumed that the 
legislature acted with integrity and with an honest 
purpose to keep within constitutional limits . . . as a 
corollary of the presumption favoring 
constitutionality, the fact that one among alternative 
constructions would involve serious constitutional 
difficulties is reason to reject that interpretation in 
favor of another. It has even been said that "a 
strained construction is not only permissible, but 
desirable, if it is the only construction that will 
save constitutionality." 
2A Sutherland Stat. Const. § 45.11 (4th Ed. 1984 Revision). 
Utah statutes must be construed as harmonious with the Utah 
Constitution and, therefore, must not be interpreted as giving 
towns the power of condemnation. The Utah Constitution 
specifically reserves that power to cities, not towns. The 
Town's argument simply violates the basic tenets of statutory 
construction by urging an unconstitutional result. 
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POINT II: THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FINDING THAT THE TOWN OF 
MANILA HAS THE LEGAL RIGHT TO CONDEMN DEFENDANTS 
PROPERTY FOR THE PURPOSE OF CONSTRUCTING AND OPERATING 
A SEWAGE TREATMENT FACILITY. 
A. The Town Of Manila Does Not Have The Legal Right To Condemn 
Property. 
None of the cases cited by the Town, in its brief at page 
6, involve delegation of authority to condemn private property 
to towns. Rather, the cases cited all deal with cities or 
counties. The Town has conveniently ignored the fact that the 
Utah Constitution makes a distinction between towns and cities. 
The Town simply has not cited a case which stands .for the 
proposition that towns have the authority to condemn private 
property for construction of a sewage treatment lagoon. 
Contrary to the Town's assertion, while Title 10, Chapter 8 
of the Utah Code specifically confers upon towns the same powers 
and authority granted to cities under Chapter 8, nowhere in 
Chapter 8 are cities given the powerj of eminent domain. 
Therefore, this section does not confer any eminent domain power 
upon a town. Furthermore, the Town misplaces its reliance on 
Utah Code Ann., § 10-16-4(1)(c). That section states that: 
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(1) The governing body of any municipality may make or 
cause to be made any one or more or a combination of 
the following improvements: • • . (c) To construct, 
reconstruct, extend, maintain, or repair bridges, 
sidewalks, crosswalks, driveways, culverts, sewers, 
storm sewers, drains, flood barriers, and channels;. 
The power to construct, reconstruct, extend, maintain or repair 
does not equal the power to condemn private property. Nor does 
the power to acquire real property equal the right to condemn in 
fee simple; that power must be specifically conferred. 
The Town cites a Kansas case and a Washington case for the 
proposition that precise statutory language on public uses for 
condemnation in fee simple is not required. Utah law is 
directly contrary. For example, in Bertagnoli v. Baker, 215 
P.2d 26 (Utah 1950), cited in Broadbent's brief at page 14-15, 
the Utah Supreme Court stated that statutes conferring the 
rights of eminent domain must be strictly construed in favor of 
the landowner because the right of eminent domain is in 
derogation of the rights of the individual property owners. 
Bertagnoli, 215 P.2d at 628. The Court also noted that since the 
extra territorial power of condemnation of property outside the 
district was not expressly granted by statute, it could not be 
impliedly conferred. Bertagnoli, 215 P.2d at 630. Therefore, in 
Utah condemnation of property does require precise statutory 
language and precise confirmation of the power of eminent domain. 
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The Town also relies on Utah Code Ann. , § 78-34-1(3), (9) 
as authority for the exercise of eminent domain for all public 
uses and for sewerage of any city or town. The Town 
conveniently fails to bring to the Court's attention Utah Code 
Ann., § 78-34-2. This section provides that only the specific 
public uses mentioned in subparagraph 1 may be condemned in fee 
simple and that for any other public use not mentioned in 
subparagraph 1, the only right which may be granted is an 
easement. The uses mentioned in subparagraph 1 are: 
A fee simple, when taken for public buildings or 
grounds or for permanent buildings, for reservoirs and 
dams and permanent flooding occasioned thereby or for 
an outlet or for a flow, or for a place for the deposit 
of debris or tailings of a mine, mill, smelter, or 
other place for the reduction of ores or for solar 
evaporation ponds and other facilities for the recovery 
of minerals in solution; provided that where surface 
ground is underlaid with minerals, coal or other 
deposits sufficiently valuable to justify extraction, 
only a perpetual easement may be taken over the surface 
ground over such deposits. 
A sewage system is not covered by subparagraph 1 and therefore 
falls under sub-paragraph 2, which grants "an easement, when 
taken for any other use." The Town could not condemn in fee 
simple as § 78-34-2 places limitations upon the right of 
condemnation for public uses. 
The Town misconstrues Utah Code Ann., § 10-16-3(9) and Utah 
Code Ann. , § 10-16-4 (1) (c) as being authority for the 
proposition that the Utah Legislature has given the power to any 
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municipality to construct sewer systems and acquire any property 
necessary or advisable for its construction. Article XI § 5(c) 
of the Utah Constitution specifically authorizes cities to "make 
local improvements and to acquire by condemnation or otherwise, 
property within its corporate limits necessary for such 
improvement . . . ." Towns have no constitutional authority to 
condemn. The authority to acquire property for improvements 
granted to municipalities in § 10-16-4 (1) (1) can only mean that 
as to towns such acquisition must be by means other than through 
condemnation or, alternatively, that "municipality11 must refer 
here only to cities. The statute must be construed in such a 
manner as to uphold its constitutionality. 2A Sutherland Stat. 
Const. § 45.11 (4th Ed. 1984 Revision). 
The Town also quotes from the Municipal Bond Act on funding 
for a sewer system and argues that since a bond may be given 
whether or not the property lies within the limits of the 
municipality that somehow this gives the Town the power to 
condemn property lying outside of its corporate boundary. This 
conclusion is both illogical and contrary to Utah law. 
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B. There Is No Authority For Condemnation Outside Town 
Boundaries For Construction Of A Sewage Lagoon. 
The Town seems to make the general argument that since it 
needs the power of eminent domain to acquire property located 
outside of its corporate boundaries it must necessarily possess 
this power and authority. Utah Law, however, simply does not 
confer upon towns the power to condemn property. Additionally, 
there is no authority whatsoever for condemnation of property 
outside a town's boundaries for construction of a sewage lagoon. 
See, discussion in Broadbent's brief at Point II, pages 19 
through 22, and Point III pages 23 through 25. 
POINT III: THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT MAKE A FULL INQUIRY INTO 
THE NECESSITY OF THE TAKING IN THIS CASE NOR THE 
COMPLIANCE WITH THE STATUTORY PREREQUISITES. 
It is an abuse of discretion to grant an order of immediate 
occupancy without making full inquiry into both the necessity of 
the taking and compliance with the statutory prerequisites. See, 
Salt Lake County v. Ramoselli, 567 P.2d 182 (Utah 1977), cited 
and discussed in Broadbent's brief at pages 27 through 28. The 
trial court did neither. 
The Town failed to comply with Utah Code Ann. , § 78-34-9 
which requires the Town to establish the damage which will 
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accrue from the condemnation and the reasons for requiring a 
speedy occupation of the property. The granting or refusal of a 
motion for immediate occupancy must be decided according to the 
equity of the case and the relative damages which may accrue to 
the parties. Utah Department of Transportation v. Hatch, 613 
P. 2d 764 (Utah 1980). The court cannot have correctly ruled on 
the motion without taking evidence on the damages which would 
accrue to the owner of the property. Such damages have been 
exacerbated by the deliberate strategy of the Town in forging 
ahead with its occupation of the property and construction of the 
lagoon when it was on notice that its authority to condemn was in 
question and there had not been a final determination of this 
issue. 
POINT IV: BROADBENT HAS NEVER HAD A TRIAL ON THE MERITS. 
The Town urges this Court to believe that Broadbent is 
asking for a second evidentiary hearing on the issues of law. 
Broadbent is not asking for a second evidentiary hearing, but 
rather is asking for opportunity for an initial evidentiary 
hearing. The hearing that the Town considered to be a full 
hearing on the merits was the hearing on the order of immediate 
occupancy which was limited solely to the Town's burden of 
making a prima facie case to substantiate an order of immediate 
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occupancy. Broadbent's counsel specifically reserved the issues 
surrounding the merits for trial. See, Brief of Appellant at 
page 34. 
In Utah State Road Commission v. Friberg, 687 P.2d 821 
(Utah 1984), the court held that the State's right to condemn, 
if challenged, can finally be determined only after a trial on 
the merits and not at the hearing on the motion for immediate 
occupancy. Friberg is controlling and is not distinguishable 
from the present case. Neither in Fribeyg nor in the present 
case was there a full evidentiary hearing. See, discussion of 
Friberg in Broadbentfs brief at pages 3 3 through 35. See also. 
State v. Denver and Rio Grande Railroad, 8 Utah 20, 236, -238, 
332 P.2d 926 (927) 1958. 
RESPONSE TO AMICUS CURIAE BRIEF OF THE UTAH LEAGUE OF 
CITIES AND TOWNS 
The Utah League of Cities and Towns (the "League") relies 
on the case of Wadsworth et. al. v. Sant^quin City et al. , 83 
Utah 321, 28 P.2d 161 (Utah 1933). The issue in that case was 
whether or not a non-chartered city could utilize the powers 
conferred upon cities to issue revenue borids. The League, like 
the Town, has not cited a single precedent for the proposition 
that a town has the authority to condemn property located 
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outside of its corporate boundaries. Rather they rely on a case 
which weighs the relative rights of chartered and non-chartered 
cities. 
The point in Wadsworth was that Article XI, Section 5 
granted certain powers to "cities." The question before the 
court in Wadsworth was: are "non-chartered" cities actually 
"cities" within the meaning of Article XI, Section 5? The Court 
found that non-chartered cities had the same powers as chartered 
cities since the Utah Constitution does not make a distinction 
between non-chartered cities and cities. Wadsworth, 28 P. 2d at 
168. The crucial distinction here is that the Utah Constitution 
does make a distinction between cities and towns. Even according 
to Wadsworth, the courts must follow that distinction. 
The League also tries to argue, like the Town, that since 
towns need the extra territorial power of condemnation they must 
necessarily have it. This is simply not the law in the State of 
Utah. 
The League also argues that a town can maintain a sewer 
system located outside of its boundary. Even if towns are given 
the power to maintain a sewer system, that power of maintenance 
does not equal the power of condemnation. 
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CONCLUSION 
Broadbent urges this Court to reverse the decision of the 
District Court on the issue of the Town's authority to condemn 
and remand the case with instructions for a full evidentiary 
hearing on the conditions precedent to condemnation and the 
Town's right to condemn property in fee simple located outside 
of its corporate boundaries for construction of a sewage 
treatment lagoon. 
DATED this [i day of June, 1990, 
VAN WAGONER & STEVENS 
Lewis T. Stevens 
Kristin G* Brewer 
By: ^ ^ ^ r ( W ^ V ^ 
Attorneys for App€ Ito ellant 
Broadbent Land Company 
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CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS 
Article XI, § 5(b) and (c) 
viii 
CONSTITUTION OF UTAH, Article XI, § 5. 
Sec, 5. [Municipal corporations - To be created by general law 
- Right and manner of adopting charter for own 
government - Powers included•] 
Corporations for municipal purposes shall not be created 
by special laws. The legislature by general laws^ shall 
provide for the incorporation, organization and classification 
of cities and towns in proportion to population, which laws 
may be altered, amended or repealed. Any incorporated city or 
town may frame and adopt a charger for its own government in 
the following manner: 
The legislative authority of the city may, by two-thirds 
vote of its members, and upon petition of qualified electors 
to the number of fifteen per cent of all votes cast at the 
next preceding election for the office of the mayor, shall 
forthwith provide by ordinance for the submission to the 
electors of the question: "Shall a commission be chosen to 
frame a character?" The ordinance shall require that the 
question be submitted to the electors at the next regular 
municipal election. The ballot containing such question shall 
also contain the names of candidates for members of the 
proposed commission, but without party designation. Such 
candidates shall be nominated in the same manner as required 
by law for nomination of city officers. If a majority of the 
electors voting on the question of choosing a commission shall 
vote in the affirmative, then the fifteen candidates receiving 
a majority of the votes case at such election, shall 
constitute the charter commission, and shall proceed to frame 
a charter. 
Any charter so framed shall be submitted to the qualified 
electors of the city at an election to be held at a time to be 
determined by the charter commission, which shall be not less 
than sixty days subsequent to its completion and distribution 
among the electors and not more than one year from such date. 
Alternative provisions may also be submitted to be voted upon 
separately. The commission shall make provisions for the 
distribution of copies of the proposed charter and of any 
alternative provisions to the qualified electors of the city, 
not less than sixty days before the ejection at which it is 
voted upon. Such proposed charter and such alternative 
provisions as are approved by a majority of the electors 
voting thereon, shall become an organic law of such city at 
such time as may be fixed therein, a^ id shall supersede any 
existing charter and all laws affecting the organization and 
government of such city which are now in conflict therewith. 
Within thirty days after its approval a copy of such charter 
as adopted, certified by the mayor and city recorder and 
authenticated by the seal of such city, shall be made in 
duplicate and deposited, one in the office of the secretary of 
Constitution of Utah, Article XI, § 5 continued. 
State and the other in the office of the city recorder, and 
thereafter all courts shall take judicial notice of such 
charter. 
Amendments to any such charter may be framed and 
submitted by a charter commission in the same manner as 
provided for making of charters, or may be proposed by the 
legislative authority of the city upon a two-thirds vote 
thereof, or by petition of qualified electors to a number 
equal to fifteen per cent of the total votes cast for mayor on 
the next preceding election, and any such amendment may be 
submitted at the next regular municipal election, and having 
been approved by the majority of the electors voting thereon, 
shall become part of the charter at the time fixed in such 
amendment and shall be certified and filed as provided in case 
of charters. 
Each city forming its charter under this section shall 
have, and is hereby granted, the authority to exercise all 
powers relating to municipal affairs, and to adopt and enforce 
within its limits, local police, sanitary and similar 
regulations not in conflict with the general law, and no 
enumeration of powers in this Constitution or any law shall be 
deemed to limit or restrict the general grant of authority 
hereby conferred; but this grant of authority shall not 
include the power to regulate public utilities, not 
municipally owned, if any such regulation of public utilities 
is provided for by general law, nor be deemed to limit or 
restrict the power of the legislature in matters relating to 
State affairs, to enact general laws applicable alike to all 
cities of the State. 
The power to be conferred upon the cities by this section 
shall include the following: 
(a) To levy, assess and collect taxes and borrow money, 
within the limits prescribed by general law, and to levy 
and collect special assessments for benefits conferred. 
(b) To furnish all local public services, to purchase, 
hire, construct, own, maintain or operate, or lease, public 
utilities local in extent and use; to acquire by 
condemnation, or otherwise, within or without the corporate 
limits, property necessary for any such purposes, subject to 
restrictions imposed by general law for the protection of 
other communities; and to grant local public utility 
franchises and within its powers regulate the exercise 
thereof. 
(c) To make local public improvements and to acquire by 
condemnation, or otherwise, property within its corporate 
Constitution of Utah, Article XI, § 5 continued. 
limits necessary for such improvements; and also to acquire 
an excess over than [that] needed for any such improvement 
and to sell or lease such excess property with restrictions, 
in order to protect and preserve the improvement. 
(d) To issue and sell bonds on the security of any such 
excess property, or of any public utility owned by the city, 
or of the revenues thereof, or both, including, in the case 
of public utility, a franchise stating the terms upon which, 
in case of foreclosure, the purchaser may operate such 
utility. (As amended November 8, 1932, effective January 1, 
1933.) 
Utah Code A n n o t a t e d , § 7 8 - 2 - £ ( 3 ) ( j ) 
i x 
78-2-2(3)(j) Supreme Court jurisdiction. 
(3) The Supreme Court has appellate jurisdiction, 
including jurisdiction of interlocutory appeals, over: 
(j) orders, judgments, and decrees of any court of 
record over which the Court of Appeals does not have original 
appellate jurisdiction. 
Utah Code Annotated. § 57-l£-l et. seq. 
x 
57-12-1. Short title. 
This act shall be known and may be cited as the 
"Utah Relocation Assistance Act." 
57-12-2. Declaration of policy. 
This is hereby declared to be the policy of this act 
and of the state of Utah, and the Legislature recognizes: 
(1) That it is often necessary for the various 
agencies of state and local government to acquire land by 
condemnation; 
(2) That persons, businesses, and farms are often 
uprooted and displaced by such action while being recompensed 
only for the value of land taken; 
(3) That such displacement often works economic 
hardship on those least able to suffer the added and 
uncompensated costs of moving, locating new homes, business 
sites, farms, and other costs of being relocated; 
(4) That such added expenses should reasonably be 
included as a part of the project cost and paid to those 
displaced; 
(5) That the Congress of the United States has 
established matching grants for relocation assistance, and has 
also established uniform policies for land acquisition under 
the Uniform Relocation Assistance and Land Acquisition Policies 
Act of 1970, to assist the states in meeting these expenses 
and assuring that land is fairly acquired; 
(6) That it is in the public interest for the state 
of Utah to provide for such payments and to establish such land 
acquisition policies. 
Therefore, the purpose of this act is to establish a 
uniform policy for the fair and equitable treatment of persons 
displaced by the acquisition of real property by state and 
local land acquisition programs, by building code enforcement 
activities, or by a program of voluntary rehabilitation of 
buildings or other improvements conducted pursuant to 
governmental supervision. 
All of the provisions of the act shall be liberally 
construed to put into effect the foregoing policies and 
purposes. 
Utah Code Annotated. § 10-1^-3(9) 
x i 
10-16-3. Cities and Towns. 
(9) "Municipality" means a city or town of this state. 
Utah Code Annotated. § 10-16-4(1)(c) and (1) 
xii 
10-16-4. POWERS OF MUNICIPALITY. 
(1) The government body of any municipality may make or cause 
to be made any one or more or combination of the following 
improvements: 
(c) to construct, reconstruct, extend, maintain, or 
repair bridges, sidewalks, crosswalks, driveways, culverts, 
sewers, storm sewers, drains, flood barriers, and channels; 
(1) to acquire any property necessary or advisable in 
order to make any of these improvements; 
Utah Code Annotated, § 78-^4-2 
x i i i 
78-34-2. Estates and rights that may be taken. 
The following is a classification of the estates and 
rights in lands subject to be taken for public use: 
(1) a fee simple, when taken fot public buildings or 
grounds or for permanent buildings, for reservoirs and dams 
and permanent flooding occasioned thereby, or for an outlet 
for a flow, or a place for the deposit of debris or tailings 
of a mine, mill, smelter or other place for the reduction of 
ores, or for solar evaporation ponds and other facilities 
for the recovery of minerals in solution; provided that 
where surface ground is underlaid with minerals, coal or 
other deposits sufficiently valuable to justify extraction, 
only a perpetual easement may be taken over the surface 
ground over such deposits. 
(2) an easement, when taken for any other use. 
(3) the right of entry upon, and occupation of lands, 
with the right to take therefrom such earth, gravel, stones, 
trees and timber as may be necessary for some public use. 
Utah Code Annotated. § 78-34-1(3) and (9) 
xiv 
78-34-1. Uses for which right may be exercised. 
Subject to the provisions of this chapter, the right of 
eminent domain may be exercised in behalf of the following 
public uses: 
(3) public buildings and grounds for the use of any 
county, city or incorporated town, or board of eduction; 
reservoirs, canals, aqueducts, flumes, ditches, or pipes for 
conducting water for the use of tl^ e inhabitants of any 
county or city or incorporated town, br for the draining of 
any county, city or incorporated town; the raising of the 
banks of streams, removing obstructions therefrom, and 
widening, deepening or straightening their channels; roads, 
streets and alleys; and all other public uses for the 
benefit of any county, city or incorporated town, or the 
inhabitants thereof. 
(9) sewerage of any city or town, or of any settlement of 
not less than ten families, or of any public building 
belonging to the state, or of any college or university• 
Utah Code Annotated. § 78-34H9 
xv 
78-34-9. Occupancy of premises pending action - Deposit paid 
into court - Procedure for payment of compensation. 
The plaintiff may move the court or a judge thereof, at 
any time after the commencement of suit, on notice to the 
defendant, if he is a resident of the state, or has appeared 
by attorney in the action, otherwise by serving a notice 
directed to him on the clerk of the court, for an order 
permitting the plaintiff to occupy the premises sought to be 
condemned pending the action, including appeal, and to do such 
work thereon as may be required. The court or a judge thereof 
shall take proof by affidavit or otherwise of the value of the 
premises sought to be condemned and of the damages which will 
accrue from the condemnation, and of the reasons for requiring 
a speedy occupation, and shall grant or refuse the motion 
according to the equity of the case and the relative damages 
which may accrue to the parties. If the motion is granted, 
the court or judge shall enter its order requiring the 
plaintiff as a condition precedent to occupancy to file with 
the clerk of the court a sum equivalent to at least 75% of the 
condemning authority's appraised valuation of the property 
sought to be condemned. The amount thijis fixed shall be for 
the purposes of the motion only, and shall not be admissible 
in evidence on final hearing. The rights of the just 
compensation for the land so taken or damaged shall vest in 
the parties entitled thereto, and said compensation shall be 
ascertained and awarded as provided in §78-34-10 and 
established by judgment therein, and the said judgment shall 
include, as part of the just compensation awarded, interest at 
the rate of 8% per annum on the amount finally awarded as the 
value of the property and damages, from the date of taking 
actual possession thereof by the plaintiff or order of 
occupancy, whichever is earlier, to the date of judgment; but 
interest shall not be allowed on so much thereof as shall have 
been paid into court. Upon the application of the parties in 
interest, the court shall order the mojney deposited in the 
court be paid forthwith for or on Account of the just 
compensation to be awarded in the proceeding. A payment to a 
defendant as aforesaid shall be held to be an abandonment by 
such defendant of all defenses excepting his claim for greater 
compensation. If the compensation finally awarded in respect 
of such lands, or any parcel thereof, shall exceed the amount 
of the money so received the court shall enter judgment 
against the plaintiff for the amount of the deficiency. If 
the amount of money so received by the defendant is greater 
than the amount finally awarded, the court shall enter 
judgment against the defendant for the amount of the excess. 
Upon the filing of the petition for immediate occupancy the 
court shall fix the time within which, and the terms upon 
which, the parties in possession shall be required to 
surrender possession to the plaintiff. The court shall make 
such orders in respect to encumbrances, liens, rents, 
assessments, insurance and other charges^ if any, as shall be 
just and equitable. 
UTAH RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE 
Rule 54(b) 
xv i 
Rule 54(b). Judgments; costs. 
(b) Judgment upon multiple claims and/or involving 
multiple parties. When more than one claim for relief is 
presented in an action, whether as a claim, counterclaim, 
cross-claim, or third-party claim, and/or when multiple 
parties are involved, the court may direct the entry of a 
final judgment as to one or more but fewer than all of the 
claims or parties only upon an express determination by the 
court that there is no just reason for delay and upon an 
express direction for the entry of judgment. In the absence 
of such determination and direction, any order or other form 
of decision, however designated, which adjudicates fewer than 
all the claims or the rights and liabilities of fewer than all 
the parties shall not terminate the action as to any of the 
claims or parties, and the order or other form of decision is 
subject to revision at any time before the entry of judgment 
adjudicating all the claims and the rights and liabilities of 
all the parties. 
RUIiES OF THE UTAH SUPREME COURT 
Rule 3 
xvii 
Rule 3. Appeal as of right. How taken. 
(a) Filing appeal from final orders and judgments. An 
appeal may be taken from a district court to the Supreme Court 
from all final orders and judgments, except as otherwise 
provided by law, by filing a notice of appeal with the clerk 
of the district court within the time allowed by Rule 4. 
Failure of an appellant to take any step other than the timely 
filing of a notice of action as the Supreme Court deems 
appropriate, which may include dismissal of the appeal or 
other sanctions short of dismissal, as well as the award of 
attorney's fees. 
RULES OF THE UTAH SUPREMfe COURT 
Rule 4 
xviii 
RULE 4. Appeal as of right: When takert. 
(a) Appeal from final judgment and order. In a case in 
which an appeal is permitted as a matter of right from the 
district court to the Supreme Court, the notice of appeal 
required by Rule 3 shall be filed with the clerk of the 
district court within 30 days after the date of entry of the 
judgment or order appealed from; provided however, when a 
judgment or order is entered in a statutory forcible entry or 
unlawful detainer action, the notice of appeal required by 
Rule 3 shall be filed with the clerk of the district court 
within 10 days after the date of entry of the judgment or 
order appealed from, 
(b) Motions post judgment or order. If a timely motion 
under the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure is filed in the 
district court by any party: (1) for judgment under Rule 
50(b); (2) under Rule 52(b) to amend or make additional 
findings of fact, whether or not an alternation of the 
judgment would be required if the motion is granted; (3) under 
Rule 59 to alter or amend the judgment; or (4) under Rule 59 
for a new trial, the time for appeal for all parties shall run 
from the entry of the order denying a new trial or granting or 
denying any other such motion. Similarly, if a timely motion 
under the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure is filed in the 
district court by any party: (1) under Rule 24 for a new 
trial; or (2) under Rule 26 for an order, after judgment, 
affecting the substantial rights of a defendant, the time for 
appeal for all parties shall run from the entry of the order 
denying a new trial or granting or denying any other such 
motion. A notice of appeal filed before the disposition of 
any of the above motions shall have no effect. A new notice 
of appeal must be filed within the prescribed time measured 
from the entry of the order of the district court disposing of 
the motion as provided above. 
(c) Filing prior to entry of judgment or order. Except 
as provided in Paragraph (b) of this rule, a notice of appeal 
filed after the announcement of a decision, judgment or order 
but before the entry of the judgment or order of the district 
court shall be treated as filed after such entry and on the 
day thereof. 
(d) Additional or cross appeal. If a timely notice of 
appeal is filed by a party, any other party may file a notice 
of appeal within 14 days after the date on which the first 
notice of appeal was filed, or within the time otherwise 
prescribed by Paragraph (a) of this rule, whichever period 
last expires. 
(e) Extension of time to appeal. The district court, 
upon a showing of excusable neglect or gpod cause, may extend 
the time for filing a notice of appeal i^ pon motion filed not 
Rule 4 continued. 
later than 30 days after the expiration of the time prescribed 
by Paragraph (a) of this rule. Any such motion which is filed 
before expiration of the prescribed time may be ex parte 
unless the district court otherwise requires. Notice of any 
such motion which is filed after expiration of the prescribed 
time shall be given to the other parties in accordance with 
the district court rules of practice. No extension shall 
exceed 3 0 days past the prescribed time or 10 days from the 
date of the entry of the order granting the motion, whichever 
occurs later. 
2A SUTHERLAND STAT CONST. § 45.lfL (4th Ed 1984) 
xix 
§45.11. Constitutional considerations. 
It is frequently asserted by the courts that every 
presumption favors the validity of an act of the legislature 
and that all doubts must be resolved in support of the act. 
Likewise, it is presumed that the legislature acted with 
integrity and with an honest purpose to keep within 
constitutional limits. The presumption is not conclusive, 
however, and its actual influence on decisions concerning the 
validity of legislation is not susceptible of demonstration. 
As a corollary of the presumption favoring 
constitutionality, the fact that one among alternative 
constructions would involve serious constitutional 
difficulties is reason to reject that interpretation in favor 
of another. It has even been said that "a strained 
construction is not only permissible, but desirable, if it is 
the only construction that will save constitutionality." But 
federal courts are without power to save state laws from the 
vice of vagueness by giving them definiteness through a 
limiting construction. 
